On Tuesday, The Guardian’s Spencer Ackerman reported on the “equivalent of a CIA black site” operated by police in Chicago. When computer program analyst Kory Wright opened the story, he told me, “I immediately recognized the building” — because, the Chicago resident says, he was zip-tied to a bench there for hours in an intentionally overheated room without access to water or a bathroom, eventually giving false statements to try and end his ordeal.
A friend of Wright’s swept up in the same police raid described his own brutal treatment at the facility, known as Homan Square, including attacks to his face and genitals. The experiences of the two men line up with the way defense attorneys described the “black site” warehouse to Ackerman: as a place where detainees were held off the books, without access to lawyers, while being beaten or shackled for long periods of time.
Wright claims that nine years ago, he spent “at least six [brutal] hours” at the Homan facility on his 21st birthday. He says that he was never read his Miranda rights, and that his arrest was not put into the police system until after his ordeal was over. Wright was reminded of the facility again this week when he noticed a tweet from a writer he admires, The Atlantic’s Ta-Nehisi Coates, linking to Ackerman’s story. Ackerman compared Homan Square to the network of shadowy torture centers built by the CIA across the Middle East — but focused “on Americans, most often poor, black and brown,” rather than on purported overseas terrorists.
But unlike CIA black sites, Homan Square wasn’t a completely furtive enterprise. Several lawyers and anti-police brutality advocates with whom I spoke knew that suspects were routinely detained at Homan. The facility houses many of the police department’s special units, including the anti-gang and anti-drug task forces, along with the evidence-retrieval unit. Once suspects arrived at Homan, they did not have to be booked immediately, at least not as far as the police department was concerned, according to the people with whom I spoke. In fact, it was possible that a suspect’s arrest report wouldn’t show that he or she had ever been to Homan. Further, police could detain individuals at Homan for hours, or disappear them, before shipping them off to a district station for processing.
The Chicago Police Department declined to address the specific allegations from Wright and his friend, providing only a general statement denying abuses at Homan Square. (The same statement also appears in Ackerman’s story.) “CPD abides by all laws, rules and guidelines pertaining to any interviews of suspects or witnesses, at Homan Square or any other CPD facility,” the statement read. “There are always records of anyone who is arrested by CPD, and this is not any different at Homan Square.”
Kory Wright disagrees.
Category: Ignorant or unreasonable
Despite Losing Money Year After Year, States Still Wondering How They Can Hand Out BIGGER Subsidies To Hollywood
Fool me once, shame on me. Fool me annually and let me get my checkbook! Losses continue to mount, but some very resilient states are still willing to throw more taxpayer money at the film industry. Michigan — a state that seems to be able to generate at least one fiscal horror story per year — is one of the nation’s most consistent losers. Two years ago, it bet the state pension fund on film-related subsidies… and lost. When the “investment” failed to generate a return, nearly $2 million was removed from the already-underfunded retirement pool. One small town pinned its hopes and dreams on a film project that promised 3,000 new jobs but instead fell apart, dragging the town towards insolvency.
Michigan has made some moves in the right direction after being burned so often by Hollywood and its fleeting, mercenary “interest” in its state. It paid out nearly $100 million in subsidies in 2011, but that number has dropped to $38 million for the coming year. Michigan House Minority leader Tim Greimel is pushing to bring that back up to $50 million, claiming that the program has been a great job creator — an assertion that couldn’t be farther from the truth.
Dr. Mario J.A. Saad Tries, And Fails, To Censor American Diabetes Association
Dr. Saad is mad.
Dr. Saad is mad because of something bad — specifically, the American Diabetes Association, through its journal Diabetes, is publishing expressions of concern about some of his scholarly articles, and may formally withdraw them.
Expressions of concern — like formal withdrawal of past articles — are part of the peer review process. It’s how scientific journals police themselves and call attention to questions raised about research they’ve published. Naturally they are a source of annoyance to the authors questioned, as I’ve written about in the cases of several legal threats against the blog Retraction Watch.
So when the ADA began questioning Dr. Saad’s work, he and his lawyers at Deutsch Williams did not rely on the peer review process, or on advocacy or persuasion. Don’t be ridiculous! This is America. So they sued.
Here’s 140 Fully-Redacted Pages Explaining How Much Snowden’s Leaks Have Harmed The Nation’s Security
If the US intelligence committee is concerned about the status of “hearts and minds” in its ongoing NSA v. Snowden battle, it won’t be winning anyone over with its latest response to a FOIA request.
Various representatives of the intelligence community have asserted (sometimes repeatedly) that Snowden’s leaks have caused irreparable harm to intelligence-gathering efforts and placed the nation in “grave danger.” But when given the chance to show the public how much damage has been done, it declares everything on the subject too sensitive to release. EVERYTHING.
Why Does the FBI Have to Manufacture its Own Plots if Terrorism and ISIS Are Such Grave Threats?
The FBI and major media outlets yesterday trumpeted the agency’s latest counterterrorism triumph: the arrest of three Brooklyn men, ages 19 to 30, on charges of conspiring to travel to Syria to fight for ISIS (photo of joint FBI/NYPD press conference, above). As my colleague Murtaza Hussain ably documents, “it appears that none of the three men was in any condition to travel or support the Islamic State, without help from the FBI informant.” One of the frightening terrorist villains told the FBI informant that, beyond having no money, he had encountered a significant problem in following through on the FBI’s plot: his mom had taken away his passport. Noting the bizarre and unhinged ranting of one of the suspects, Hussain noted on Twitter that this case “sounds like another victory for the FBI over the mentally ill.”
In this regard, this latest arrest appears to be quite similar to the overwhelming majority of terrorism arrests the FBI has proudly touted over the last decade. As my colleague Andrew Fishman and I wrote last month — after the FBI manipulated a 20-year-old loner who lived with his parents into allegedly agreeing to join an FBI-created plot to attack the Capitol — these cases follow a very clear pattern:
The known facts from this latest case seem to fit well within a now-familiar FBI pattern whereby the agency does not disrupt planned domestic terror attacks but rather creates them, then publicly praises itself for stopping its own plots.
First, they target a Muslim: not due to any evidence of intent or capability to engage in terrorism, but rather for the “radical” political views he expresses. In most cases, the Muslim targeted by the FBI is a very young (late teens, early 20s), adrift, unemployed loner who has shown no signs of mastering basic life functions, let alone carrying out a serious terror attack, and has no known involvement with actual terrorist groups.
They then find another Muslim who is highly motivated to help disrupt a “terror plot”: either because they’re being paid substantial sums of money by the FBI or because (as appears to be the case here) they are charged with some unrelated crime and are desperate to please the FBI in exchange for leniency (or both). The FBI then gives the informant a detailed attack plan, and sometimes even the money and other instruments to carry it out, and the informant then shares all of that with the target. Typically, the informant also induces, lures, cajoles, and persuades the target to agree to carry out the FBI-designed plot. In some instances where the target refuses to go along, they have their informant offer huge cash inducements to the impoverished target.
Once they finally get the target to agree, the FBI swoops in at the last minute, arrests the target, issues a press release praising themselves for disrupting a dangerous attack (which it conceived of, funded, and recruited the operatives for), and the DOJ and federal judges send their target to prison for years or even decades (where they are kept in special GITMO-like units). Subservient U.S. courts uphold the charges by applying such a broad and permissive interpretation of “entrapment” that it could almost never be successfully invoked.
Confidential Informant Played Key Role in FBI Foiling Its Own Terror Plot
The FBI Wednesday announced the arrest of three men it alleges planned to help the Islamic State, news that at first appeared to confirm fears that radical extremism is spreading to the United States.
“The flow of foreign fighters to Syria represents an evolving threat to our country and to our allies,” U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch said in a press release announcing the arrests. “We will vigorously prosecute those who attempt to travel to Syria to wage violent jihad on behalf of ISIL and those who support them.”
Left unmentioned in the FBI statement, however, is the integral role a paid informant appears to have played in generating the charges against the men, and helping turn a fantastical “plot” into something even remotely tangible. It appears that none of the three men was in any condition to travel or support the Islamic State, without help from the FBI informant.
On Feb. 25, two Brooklyn men were arrested following FBI and New York Police Department anti-terror raids and charged with providing “material support” to the Islamic State. Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev, 24, and Akhror Saidakhmetov 19, are alleged to have made arrangements to travel to Syria, and also to have expressed willingness to conduct attacks in the United States “if ordered to do so” by the group. A third man, Abror Habibov, 30, was arrested in Florida and charged with helping provide financial support for their travel plans.
According to the criminal complaint against the three, the FBI first began investigating Juraboev after he made postings on Uzbek-language social media sites in August 2014 praising the Islamic State and offering to pledge allegiance to them. While these postings were made anonymously, Juraboev neglected to conceal his IP address which led to him being quickly identified by authorities.
On Aug. 15, 2014, Juraboev was visited at a Brooklyn residence by FBI agents; he openly expressed his desire to join Islamic State to them. He is said to have told the agents he desired to travel and join the group, but that “he currently lacked the means to go there.” Juraboev is also said to have told the FBI agents in this interview of his desire to kill President Obama, but stated that he does not have any “means or imminent plans to do so.”
Three days after that initial visit, FBI agents visited him again; he reiterated these violent and criminal desires, stating his willingness to kill President Obama if he were ordered to do so by any member of Islamic State, and also telling the agents he was willing to “plant a bomb on Coney Island if so ordered by ISIL”.
Red Bull Disputes Old Ox Brewery Trademarked Logo/Name Because, Seriously, An Ox Is Just A Castrated Bull
Red Bull has filed a complaint with the United States Patent and Trademark Office against a small brewery in Virginia called Old Ox Brewery for the using a male cow in its name and logo. “An ‘ox’ and a ‘bull’ both fall within the same class of ‘bovine’ animals and are virtually indistinguishable to most consumers. In addition, an ox is a castrated bull,” Red Bull said in the lawsuit. “Applicant’s Old Ox marks so much resemble Red Bull so as to cause confusion, mistake or deception among purchasers, users and the public, thereby damaging Red Bull.”
Worthy of Contempt: Ohio Judge Tim Grendell Abuses His Office To Suppress Criticism
Somebody mean bruised Tim Grendell’s feels.
They didn’t do it directly. Nobody marched up to Grendell and said “you’re a petty, totalitarian thug” to his face. Nobody left a hurtful comment on his LiveJournal.
No, somebody said mean things about Tim Grendell in a private conversation with another person, a third party.
Tim Grendell caught wind of it. Now, generally, when people find out that someone is trash-talking them, they have a few options: they can rub dirt on it and walk it off like a goddamn grown-up, they can engage in debate, high or low, with their critic, or they can even sue the critic privately for some sort of redress of buttchafe.
But Tim Grendell isn’t people. He’s a judge. Specifically, he’s a judge on the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Probate and Juvenile Division in Ohio.
That gives Tim Grendell power — and he’s not afraid to abuse it.
The mean person in this story is Nancy McArthur, the Geauga County Republican Party Chairwoman. She’s not a party in any case before Judge Grendell. She’s not a lawyer in any case before Judge Grendell. She’s not a witness in any case before him, or a juror. She’s just a citizen who criticized him in a private communication.
Apparently one Robin West, a family member of a juvenile court litigant, was unhappy with Judge Grendell’s rulings. Ms. West reached out to Ms. McArthur for help. Ms. McArthur did not oblige. However, according to Ms. West, Ms. McArthur had some unflattering words about Judge Grendell. Here is how Ms. West put it in an email that eventually fell into Judge Grendell’s hands:
I am sorry I filed that petition. It is one of the WORST mistakes I have ever made in my life. I had no idea what [sic] flake Judge Grendell is. Confidentially, I talked with the chairman of the Geauga County Republican Party and she told me that Kasich appointed him [Grendell] to replace Henry in order to get him out of Columbus. She said her opinion of him and that of others in his own party is that he is [sic] narcissist and mentally ill. Also, that he is a chameleon who takes revenge on people who disagree with him. I can forward you the emails because she put it in writing.
Somehow, that email fell into Judge Grendell’s hands. Outraged by the suggestion that he is narcissistic and takes revenge on people who disagree with him, Judge Grendell immediately issued a order to show cause to Ms. McArthur, requiring her to appear promptly, disclose all of her written communications with West, and show why she should not be held in contempt and perhaps jailed:
Rather than laughing off McArthur’s comments and hitting the delete button, Grendell did the unthinkable. On Dec. 31, he issued a subpoena to McArthur, a woman who had nothing whatsoever to do with the case before him, demanding she bring to his courtroom on Jan. 8 “any and all emails and other communications to and from yourself” and the woman who’d sent the email. (We are not naming this woman since it appears that a juvenile relation of hers has a case before Grendell.)
Grendell’s reason for dragging McArthur into his courtroom, as stated in his “Summons and Order,” was to require her “to show cause why (she) should not be held in Contempt of Court for making vile, contemptuous, slanderous, and insulting language directed at the Judge which reflects negatively on the integrity of the Court and impedes the Court in the administration of justice and protection of the juvenile.”
The judge also reminded McArthur that a finding of contempt of court against her could result in “incarceration.”
Ms. McArthur lawyered up, as anyone would. Her lawyer, who had a conflicting hearing the day Judge Grendell had set, requested a brief continuance. Judge Grendell petulantly refused. Fortunately the Court of Appeals saw it differently, and granted a temporary stay of the proceedings in response to Ms. McArthur’s writ.
When a party seeks a writ from the Court of Appeals to interfere with an ongoing case in the trial court, the writ is typically styled “[Litigant] v. Superior Court.” When, as here, the writ challenges a judge’s power on a matter in which no opposing party has a dog in the fight, county counsel or the District Attorney or the Attorney General will represent the judge’s position. Here, the County Counsel took a pass, citing unspecified ethical restrictions. Good move. Grendell has his own private lawyer, a lickspittle quisling named Abraham Cantor.
Is Judge Grendell contrite, now that the press has caught wind of this? He is not. He is full of bluster and defiance:
“Nancy McArthur improperly interfered with an ongoing (juvenile court matter) by making factually false statements about the competency and legal proficiency of the juvenile court judge … to a known party in that case,” Grendell told the Maple Leaf on Monday.
“Ms. McArthur’s conduct jeopardizes sensitive judicial proceedings that involve protection of a (juvenile),” the judge said.
Grendell said he would not discuss juvenile cases in the media.
“However, the court also will not allow Nancy McArthur or anyone else with a personal political agenda to jeopardize child safety in Geauga County by undermining the credibility and integrity of the juvenile court and the court’s ability to administer justice and protect children in pending … cases,” he added.
But Judge Grendell’s position is simply unsupportable. He’s using the language often employed to justify a court’s broad contempt power. But he’s utterly ignorant of, or indifferent to, First Amendment precedent limiting that power. For more than 70 years, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the proposition that judges have some inherent power to punish speech without First Amendment constraints. Instead, the Court has repeatedly required contempt actions against third parties to be justified under the same standards — like the Brandenburg clear-and-present-danger test — as any citizen speech. In a 1941 case striking down contempt sanctions against a newspaper, the Court held:
History affords no support for the contention that the criteria applicable under the Constitution to other types of utterances are not applicable, in contempt proceedings, to out-of-court publications pertaining to a pending case.
. . .
The substantive evil here sought to be averted has been variously described below. It appears to be double: disrespect for the judiciary; and disorderly and unfair administration of justice. The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste,16 on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignify of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect. Bridges v. State of Cal., 314 U.S. 252, 268, 270-71 (1941).Most subsequent cases applying the First Amendment to sanctions for court-proceeding-related speech have involved lawyers, whose conduct in connection with courts where they practice is more subject to restriction. But even in those cases — even where a lawyer in a case before a judge is speaking in public about that case — the Supreme Court has only approved the most narrow and substantially-justified restrictions. For instance, in 1991, a bare majority of the Court found that a Nevada bar rule limiting attorney comment on pending matters could potentially pass muster because it was so limited:
The restraint on speech is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited-it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial. While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity, the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991)
Moreover, courts have applied familiar free speech doctrines — like the distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion — to cases about criticism of judges. For instance, quoth the Ninth Circuit:
It follows that statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not be punished unless they are capable of being proved true or false; statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment unless they “imply a false assertion of fact.” See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir.1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977) (statement of opinion actionable “only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion”). Even statements that at first blush appear to be factual are protected by the First Amendment if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about their target. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 879, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). Thus, statements of “rhetorical hyperbole” aren’t sanctionable, nor are statements that use language in a “loose, figurative sense.” See National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2781, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (use of word “traitor” could not be construed as representation of fact); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1541, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) (use of word “blackmail” could not have been interpreted as charging plaintiff with commission of criminal offense). Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995)
Under these standards, Judge Grendell’s actions are shockingly lawless. Ms. McArthur is not a party or attorney or witness before the judge, and therefore his power to limit speech is at its very weakest. Ms. McArthur spoke privately to a third party, and not in public. There is no chance that the judge can establish that her criticism had the requisite “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” a proceeding before him. If he could, that would mean any vigorous criticism of a judge — from a lowly commissioner to Supreme Court Justice — could get the speaker hailed into court. Moreover, Ms. McArthur’s comments — as related by West — are explicitly statements of opinion and clearly rhetorical hyberbole: “She said her opinion of him and that of others in his own party is that he is [sic] narcissist and mentally ill. Also, that he is a chameleon who takes revenge on people who disagree with him.” Even if the last sentence were not opinion, Judge Grendell’s actions show that it is true.
Judge Grendell is engaged in a grotesque abuse of his judicial power — the very worst sort of black robe fever — to vent his childish pique. This sort of thing happens more often than you might think. It’s not unique to judges. It’s the way too many humans act when given power. Judges are only unique in the extent of their privileges and their tendency to evade consequences for bad behavior.
Let’s hope that the Ohio Court of Appeals puts Judge Grendell in his place. Let’s hope that this incident permanently impairs his reputation and prevents further advancement. Let’s remember: we can’t put all of our trust in judges to protect us from the abuses of other judges. That’s a paper shield. To protect our right to free speech, we must use it vigorously when the rights of others are threatened. We must ensure that misconduct and abuse of power like this renders public life intolerable for people like Judge Grendell.
Dear Judge Grendell: I will accept service of any Order to Show Cause you may wish to issue to me.
TSA Issues Secret Warning on ‘Catastrophic’ Threat to Aviation
The Transportation Security Administration said it is unlikely to detect and unable to extinguish what an FBI report called “the greatest potential incendiary threat to aviation,” according to a classified document obtained by The Intercept. Yet despite that warning, sources said TSA is not adequately preparing to respond to the threat.
Thermite — a mixture of rust and aluminum powder — could be used against a commercial aircraft, TSA warned in a Dec. 2014 document, marked secret. “The ignition of a thermite-based incendiary device on an aircraft at altitude could result in catastrophic damage and the death of every person onboard,” the advisory said.
TSA said it is unlikely to spot an easy-to-assemble thermite-based incendiary device during security screening procedures, and the use of currently available extinguishers carried on aircrafts would create a violent reaction. The TSA warning is based on FBI testing done in 2011, and a subsequent report.
A thermite device, though difficult to ignite, would “produce toxic gasses, which can act as nerve poison, as well as a thick black smoke that will significantly inhibit any potential for in-flight safety officers to address the burn.”
TSA warned federal air marshals not to use customary methods of extinguishing fires — the water or halon fire extinguishers currently found on most aircraft — which would make the reaction worse, creating toxic fumes. Instead, air marshals are told to “recognize a thermite ignition” — but TSA has provided no training or guidance on how to do so, according to multiple sources familiar with the issue.
Is Retweeting ISIS ‘Material Support Of Terrorism’?
Last week there was a bizarre and ill-informed post by music industry lawyer Chris Castle — who has a weird infatuation with the idea that Google must be pure evil — in which he tried to argue that because YouTube wasn’t able to take down propaganda videos showing ISIS atrocities fast enough, that Google was providing “material support” for terrorism. As Castle notes:
Google’s distribution of jihadi videos on Google’s monopoly video search platform certainly looks like material support of terrorists which is itself a violation of the federal law Google claims to hold so dear. (See 18 U.S. Code §2339A and §2339B aka the U.S. Patriot Act.)
Of course, there are all sorts of problems with the Patriot Act, including its definitions of “material support of terrorism,” but to stretch the law to argue that providing an open platform and simply not removing videos fast enough (the videos in question all got removed pretty rapidly anyway, but not fast enough for Castle) is somehow “material support for terrorism” is flat out crazy. It stems from the same sort of confused logic that Castle has used in the past, arguing that Google and others must magically “just know” what is infringing and what is not — suggesting a true lack of understanding about the scale of offerings like YouTube and the resources needed to sort through all the content.
We were inclined to simply dismiss Castle’s nuttiness to the category of “WTF” where it belongs… until at a conference earlier this week, a DOJ official, John Carlin, who holds the role of assistant attorney general for national security, appeared to suggest that anyone helping ISIS’s social media campaign could be guilty of “material support” for terrorism:
John Carlin, the assistant attorney general for national security, told a cybersecurity conference in Washington on Monday that officials could try to blunt ISIS’s violent PR operation by essentially trying propagandists as terrorists. He suggested the Justice Department could bring prosecutions under the law against providing material support to a terrorist organization. His remarks were believed to be the first time a U.S. official has ever said that people who assist ISIS with online media could face criminal prosecution.
Carlin was asked at the conference whether he would “consider criminal charges” against people who are “proliferating ISIS social media.”
His answer: “Yes. You need to look at the particular facts and evidence.” But Carlin noted that the United States could use the material support law to prosecute “technical expertise” to a designated terrorist organization. And spreading the word for ISIS online could count as such expertise.