Malibu Media v. John Doe (OHSD 14-cv-00493) is one of the cases I list on the “Cases to watch” page. A mere fact that the defendant is represented by Jason Sweet means that it is worth attentively watching how this case progresses.
I wrote about this lawsuit half a year ago. That post was mainly about the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff didn’t need to know the Doe’s identity because his/her attorney would happily accept the service. The motion exchange revealed that Malibu’s local Yousef Faroniya is merely a stooge who files shakedown lawsuits and forwards email to/from the troll center in Miami. Not surprisingly, he avoids talking to the opposite party’s attorneys at all costs; hence I named the post “Copyright troll Yousef Faroniya and his telephonophobia.”
Normally I would edit the post to append a new information, but because at least three major events happened since my last update, a new article is appropriate. These events are:
the judge’s order denying the defendant’s motion to quash, and striking parts of the plaintiff’s complaint;
the defense’s motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve;
the plaintiff’s violation of the court’s order and the resulting motion to show cause.Unfortunately, Judge Timothy Black was not persuaded by Sweet’s argument and on 1/21/2015ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to know the defendant’s identity. Nonetheless, while the judge didn’t explicitly order not to identify the defendant publicly at that time, the tone of the order suggested the assumption that the defendant would proceed pseudonymously.
Denying the motion to quash didn’t mean that Judge Black was happy with the plaintiff’s conduct. The following paragraphs from the complaint piqued his attention:
25. IPP’s software also logged Defendant’s IP address being used to distribute third party files through BitTorrent. This evidence indicates that Defendant engaged in BitTorrent transactions associated with 2732 files between 06/23/2013 and 05/13/2014. Collectively, this evidence is referred as the “Additional Evidence”.
26. Plaintiff has the Additional Evidence on a document and can produce it.
27. The Additional Evidence demonstrates that Defendant is a persistent BitTorrent user.
28. Many of the titles to the third party works may also be relevant to proving Defendant is the infringer because they correlate to the Defendant’s hobbies, profession, or other interests.
Those who follow these cases remember that Malibu Media and its attorney Mary K. Schulz wassanctioned twice in Wisconsin for filing an infamous irrelevant and scandalous “exhibit C” — the list of filenames, many of which are embarrassing, purportedly shared from the defendant’s IP address. The judge thought that the above paragraphs from the complaint are nothing but a concealed “Exhibit C,” so he sua sponte ordered to strike this travesty.
Tag: M. Keith Lipscomb
Despite an overwhelming proof of innocence, Malibu’s lawyers continue dragging the defendant through a frivolous lawsuit
Remember how copyright troll M. Keith Lipscomb, after finding out beyond any reasonable and unreasonable doubt that a defendant in a Malibu Media Bittorent infringement case is absolutely innocent, threatened to ruin his life nonetheless? Today we witness a painfully similar scenario: after the defendant in Malibu Media v. Roberto Roldan (FLMD 13-cv-03007) filed an alibi-grade proof that he couldn’t have been an infringer, Lipscomb & Co doubled down in a futile attempt to save face and avoid paying attorney fees.
This case was conceived on 11/27/2013. In the complaint, Malibu claimed the infringement of 40 XArt’s hardcore porn flicks. After Brighthouse sold its subscriber’ identity to the troll, Lipscomb decided to name not the subscriber, but his son. Why? Because he is a young male and because he liked some popular music and movies on Facebook — the titles that were allegedly shared using the IP address in question. In addition, the LexisNexis’s Accurint database [incorrectly] listed the defendant as a tenant in his parents’ house at the dates the alleged infringement was recorded.
Good Man Productions, Inc.: a zombie troll plaintiff
A copyright shakedown outfit lead by M. Keith Lipscomb and his German counterparts recently filed 99 Bittorent cases “on behalf” of Good Man Productions, Inc. Those lawsuits were filed in eight districts in November-December 2014, and the plaintiff alleged infringement of a direct-to-DVD movie Good Man featuring Steven Seagal.
On 1/14/2015 it came to our attention that querying Good Man Productions, Inc. information on the web portal of California Secretary of State revealed that this entity was dissolved. As soon as I reported it, the company suddenly re-appeared, albeit with a different entity number.
Naturally, we were skeptical about the fact that registering a new corporation with the same name would solve a potentially fatal problem.
Can a dissolved copyright holder corporation continue litigating as a plaintiff in infringement cases?
A CA corporation filed dozens of copyright infringement lawsuits in Nov-Dec 2014. On 12/22/2014 it was voluntarily dissolved. Nonetheless, the cases continue, and the courts were not notified.
Are any laws or regulations broken here?After those who actually steer the litigation made aware of publicity in this matter, they re-registered this corporation on 1/16/2015. The name and the agent remained the same, yet the entity number is different.
So the second question: did this move “cure” the issue? Is it a matter of interest for the tax authorities?
One of the answers from an experienced business attorney from California, Frank Chen, confirmed what we suspected (emphasis is mine):
Nope. I assume the corporation was voluntarily dissolved (as opposed to being suspended or involuntarily dissolved through a court decree). A suspended corporation can be revived by paying back taxes, penalties and interest, and filing back tax returns. However, a dissolved corporation cannot be revived. A dissolved corporation would no longer have standing to pursue a lawsuit. Re-registration creates a new corporation, but even if the name and agent for service of process are the same, the entity is not the same entity which was the plaintiff in the lawsuit. The move does not “cure” the issue.